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Abstract. Proofs of work (PoW) have been suggested by Dwork and Naor (Crypto’92) as protection to a shared
resource. The basic idea is to ask the service requestor to dedicate some non-trivial amount of computational work
to every request. The original applications included prevention of spam and protection against denial of service
attacks. More recently, PoWs have been used to prevent double spending in the Bitcoin digital currency system.
In this work, we put forward an alternative concept for PoWs – so-called proofs of space (PoS), where a service
requestor must dedicate a significant amount of disk space as opposed to computation. We construct secure PoS
schemes in the random oracle model (with one additional mild assumption required for the proof to go through),
using graphs with high “pebbling complexity” and Merkle hash-trees. We discuss some applications, including
follow-up work where a decentralized digital currency scheme called Spacecoin is constructed that uses PoS (instead
of wasteful PoW like in Bitcoin) to prevent double spending.
The main technical contribution of this work is the construction of (directed, loop-free) graphs on N vertices with
in-degree O(log logN) such that even if one places Θ(N) pebbles on the nodes of the graph, there’s a constant
fraction of nodes that needs Θ(N) steps to be pebbled (where in every step one can put a pebble on a node if all its
parents have a pebble).
1 Introduction
Proofs of Work (PoW). Dwork and Naor [20] suggested ”proofs of work” (PoW) to address the
problem of junk emails (aka. Spam). The basic idea is to require that an email be accompanied
with some value related to that email that is moderately hard to compute but which can be verified
very efficiently. Such a proof could for example be a value σ such that the hash valueH(Email, σ)
starts with t zeros. If we model the hash functionH as a random oracle [12], then the sender must
compute an expected 2t hashes until she finds such a σ.4 A useful property of this PoW is that there
is no speedup when one has to find many proofs, i.e., finding s proofs requires s2t evaluations. The
value t should be chosen such that it is not much of a burden for a party sending out a few emails per
day (say, it takes 10 seconds to compute), but is expensive for a Spammer trying to send millions
of messages. Verification on the other hand is extremely efficient, the receiver will accept σ as a
PoW for Email, if the hash H(Email, σ) starts with t zeros, i.e., it requires only one evaluation
of the hash funciton. PoWs have many applications, and are in particular used to prevent double
spending in the Bitcoin digital currency system [42] which has become widely popular by now.
Despite many great applications, PoWs suffer from certain drawbacks. Firstly, running PoW
costs energy – especially if they are used on a massive scale, like in the Bitcoin system. For this
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4 The hashed Email should also contain the receiver of the email, and maybe also a timestamp, so that the sender has to search for
a fresh σ for each receiver, and also when resending the email at a later point in time.
reason Bitcoin has even been labelled an “environmental disaster” [5]. Secondly, by using dedi-
cated hardware instead of a general purpose processor, one can solve a PoW at a tiny fraction of
the hardware and energy costs, thus choosing “appropriate” parameters is tricky.
Proofs of Space (PoS). From a more abstract point of view, a proof of work is simply a means
of showing that one invested a non-trivial amount of effort related to some statement. This general
principle also works with resources other than computation like real money in micropayment sys-
tems [41] or human attention in CAPTCHAs [54, 16]. In this paper we put forward the concept of
proofs of space where the resource in question is disk space.
PoS are partially motivated by the observation that users often have significant amounts of free
disk anyway, and in this case using a PoS is essentially for free. This is in contrast to a PoW,
as computing will always require energy consumption even if one contributes only CPU time of
processors that would otherwise be idle.
A PoS is a protocol between a prover P and a verifier V which has two distinct phases. After
an initialisation phase P is supposed to store some data F of size N , whereas V only holds some
small piece of information. At any later time point V can initialise a proof execution phase, and at
the end V outputs reject or accept. We require that V is highly efficient in both phases, whereas P
is highly efficient in the execution phase providing he stored and has random access to the data F .
As an illustrative application for a PoS, suppose that the verifier V is an organization that
offers a free email service (we outline another example related to online polls in Appendix B.) To
prevent that someone registers a huge number of fake-addresses for spamming, V might require
users to dedicate some nontrivial amount of disk space, say 100GB, for every address registered.
Occasionally, V will run a PoS to verify that the user really dedicates this space.
The simplest solution would be for the verifier V to generate a pseudorandom 100GB file F
and send it to the prover P during an initialization phase. Later, V can ask P to send back some bits
of F at random positions, making sure V stores (at least a large fraction of) F . Unfortunately, with
this solution, V still has to send a huge 100GB file to P, which makes this approach pretty much
useless in practice.
We want a PoS where the computation, storage requirement and communication complexity
of the verifier V during initialization and execution of the PoS is very small, in particular, at most
polylogarithmic in the storage requirement N of the prover P and polynomial in some security pa-
rameter γ. In order to achieve small communication complexity, we must let the prover P generate
a large file F locally during an initialization phase, which takes some time I . Note that I must be
at least linear in N , our constructions will basically5 achieve this lower bound. Later, P and V can
run executions of the PoS which will be very cheap for V, and also for P, assuming the latter has
stored F .
Unfortunately, unlike in the trivial solution (where P sends F to V), now there is no way we
can force a potentially cheating prover P˜ to store F in-between the initialization and the execution
of the PoS: P˜ can delete F after initialization, and instead only store the (short) communication
with V during the initialization phase. Later, before an execution of the PoS, P reconstructs F (in
time I), runs the PoS, and deletes F once it is done.
5 One of our constructions will achieve the optimal I = Θ(N) bound, our second construction achieves I = O(N log logN).
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We will thus consider a security definition where one requires that a cheating prover P˜ can
only make V accept with non-negligible probability if P˜ either uses N0 bits of storage in-between
executions of the PoS or if P˜ invests time T for every execution. Here N0 ≤ N and T ≤ I are
parameters, and ideally we want them to be not much smaller than N and I , respectively. Our
actual security definition in Sect. 2 is more fine-grained, and besides the storage N0 that P˜ uses
in-between initialization and execution, we also consider a bound N1 on the total storage used by
P˜ during execution (including N0, so N1 ≥ N0).
High Level Description of our Scheme. We described above why the simple idea of having V
sending a large (pseudorandom) file F to P does not give a PoS as the communication complexity
is too large. Another simple idea that comes to mind is to have the V send the P a short description
of a “randomly behaving” permutation pi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. P then stores a table of N = n2n
bits where the entry at position i is pi−1(i). During the execution phase, V asks for the preimage of
a random value y, which P can efficiently answer by returning the value pi−1(y) at position y in the
table. Unfortunately this scheme is no a good PoS because of time-memory trade-offs for inverting
random functions [31] which allow to invert a random permutation over N values using only
√
N
time and space. For random functions (as opposed to permutations), it’s still possible to invert in
time and space N2/3. We provide a more detailed discussion on this issue in Appendix A.
The actual PoS scheme we propose is based on hard to pebble graphs. During the initalisation
phase, V sends the description of a hash function to P, who then labels the nodes of a hard to
pebble graph using this function. Here the label of a node is computed as the hash of the labels
of its children. V then computes a Merkle hash of all the labels, and sends this value to P. In the
proof execution phase, V simply asks the P to open labels corresponding to some randomly chosen
nodes.
Outline and our contribution. In this paper we introduce the concept of a PoS, which we formally
define in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we discuss and motivate the model in which we prove our constructions
secure (It is basically the random oracle model, but with an additional assumption). In Sect. 4 we
explain how to reduce the security of a simple PoS (with an inefficient verifier) to a graph pebbling
game. In Sect. 5 we show how to use hash-trees to make the verifier in the PoS from Sect. 4
efficient. In Sect. 6 we define our final construction and prove its security in Sect. 6.1 and Sect. 6.4.
Our proof uses a standard technique for proving lower bounds on the space complexity of
computational problems, called pebbling. Typically, the lower bounds shown using this method are
obtained via the pebbling games played on a directed graph. During the game a player can place
pebbles on some vertices. The game starts with some pebbles already on the graph. Informally,
placing a pebble on a vertex v corresponds to the fact that an algorithm keeps the label of a vertex
v in his memory. Removing a pebble from a vertex corresponds therefore to deleting the vertex
label from the memory. A pebble can be placed on a vertex v only if the vertices in-going to v have
pebbles, which corresponds to the fact that computing v’s label is possible only if the algorithm
keeps in his memory the labels of the in-going vertices (in our case this will be achieved by defining
the label of v to be a hash of the labels of its in-going vertices). The goal of the player is to pebble
a certain vertex of the graph. This technique was used in cryptography already before [21–23]. For
an introduction to the graph pebbling see, e.g., [48].
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In Sect. 6.1 we consider two different (infinite families of) graphs with different (and incompa-
rable) pebbling complexities. These graphs then also give PoS schemes with different parameters
(cf. Theorem 3). Informally, the construction given in Theorem 1 proves a Ω(N/ logN) bound on
the storage required by a malicious prover. Moreover, no matter how much time he is willing to
spend during the execution of the protocol, he is forced to use at least Ω(N/ logN) storage when
executing the protocol. Our second construction from Theorem 2 gives a stronger bound on the
storage. In particular, a successful malicious prover either has to dedicate Θ(N) storage (i.e., al-
most as much as theN stored by the honest prover) or otherwise it has to useΘ(N) time with every
execution of the PoS (after the initialization is completed). The second construction, whose proof
appears in Appendix C and is based on superconcentrators, random bipartite expander graphs and
on the graphs of Erdo¨s, Graham and Szemere´di [24] is quite involved and is the main technical
contribution of our paper.
We also note that a simple PoS can be constructed by storing the outputs of a random function
in a sorted list. Unfortunately, this PoS achieves very weak security due to time-memory trade-offs
as we will explain in Appendix A.
More related work and applications. Dwork and Naor [20] pioneered the concept of proofs of
work as easy-to-check proofs of computational efforts. More concretely, they proposed to use the
CPU running time that is required to carry out the proof as a measure of computational effort.
In [1] Abadi, Burrows, Manasse and Wobber observed that CPU speeds may differ significantly
between different devices and proposed as an alternative measure the number of times the memory
is accessed (i.e., the number of cache misses) in order to compute the proof. This approach was
formalized and further improved in [19, 55, 21, 4], which use pebbling based techniques. Such
memory-hard functions cannot be used as PoS as the memory required to compute and verify the
function is the same for provers and verifiers. This is not a problem for memory-hard functions as
the here the memory just has to be larger than the cache of a potential prover, whereas in a PoS the
storage is the main resource, and will typically be in the range of terabytes.
Originally put forward to counteract spamming, PoWs have a vast number of different applica-
tions such as metering web-site access [25], countering denial-of-service attacks [34, 9] and many
more [33]. An important application for PoWs are digital currencies, like the recent Bitcoin system
[42], or earlier schemes like the Micromint system of Rivest and Shamir [46]. The concept of using
bounded resources such as computing power or storage to counteract the so-called “Sybil Attack”,
i.e., misuse of services by fake identities, has already mentioned in the work of Douceur [18].
PoW are used in Bitcoin to prevent double spending: honest miners must constantly devote
more computational power towards solving PoWs than a potential adversary who tries to double
spend. This results in a gigantic waste of energy [5] devoted towards keeping Bitcoin secure, and
thus also requires some strong form of incentive for the miners to provide this computational
power.6 Recently a decentralized cryptocurrency called Spacecoin [43] was proposed which uses
PoS instead of PoW to prevent double spending. In particular, a miner in Spacecoin who wants to
dedicate N bits of disk space towards mining must just run the PoS initialisation phase once, and
6 There are two mechanisms to incentivise mining: miners who solve a PoW get some fixed reward, this is currently the main
incentive, but Bitcoin specifies that this reward will decrease over time. A second mechanism are transactions fees.
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after that mining is extremely cheap: the miner just runs the PoS execution phase, which means
accessing the stored space at a few positions, every few minutes.
A large body of work investigates the concepts of proofs of storage and proofs of retrievability
(cf. [28, 29, 13, 8, 35, 17] and many more). These are proof systems where a verifier sends a file F
to a prover, and later the prover can convince the verifier that it really stored or received the file. As
discussed above, proving that one stores a (random) file certainly shows that one dedicates space,
but these proof systems are not good PoS because the verifier has to send at least |F| bits to the
verifier, and hence does not satisfy our polylogarithmic bound on the communication complexity.
Proof of Secure Erasure (PoSE) are related to PoS. Informally, a PoSE allows a space restricted
prover to convince a verifier that he has erased its memory of size N . PoSE were suggested by Per-
ito and Tsudik [45], who also proposed a scheme where the verifier sends a random file of sizeN to
the prover, who then answers with a hash of this file. Dziembowski, Kazana and Wichs used graph
pebbling to give a scheme with small communication complexity (which moreover is independent
of N ), but large Ω(N2) computation complexity (for prover and verifier). Concurrently, and inde-
pendently of our work, Karvelas and Kiayias [36], and also Ateniese et al [7] construct PoSE using
graphs with high pebbling complexity. Interestingly, their schemes are basically the scheme one
gets when running the initialisation and execution phase of our PoS (as in eq.(7) in Theorem 3).7
[36] and [7] give a security proof of their construction in the random oracle model, and do not
make any additional assumptions as we do. The reason is that to prove that our ”collapsed PoS”
(as described above) is a PoSE it is sufficient to prove that a prover uses much space either during
initialisation or during execution. This follows from a (by now fairly standard) “ex post facto”
argument as originally used in [21]. We have to prove something much stronger, namely, that the
prover needs much space (or at least time) in the execution phase, even if he makes an unbounded
amount of queries in the initialisation phase (we will discuss this in more detail in Section 3.1).
As described above, a PoS (to be precise, a PoS where the execution phase requires large space,
not just time) implies a PoSE, but a PoSE does not imply a PoS, nor can it be used for any of
the applications mentioned in this paper. The main use-case for PoSE we know of is the one put
forward by Perito and Tsudik [45], namely, to verify that some device has erased its memory. A bit
unfortunately, Ateniese et al. [7] chose to call the type of protocols they construct also “proofs of
space” which led to some confusion in the past.
Finally, let us mention a recent beautiful paper [14] which introduces the concept of “catalytic
space”. They prove a surprising result showing that using and erasing space is not the same relative
to some additional space that is filled with random bits and must be in its original state at the end of
the computation (i.e., it’s only used as a “catalyst”). Thus, relative to such catalytic space, proving
that one has access to some space as in a PoS, and proving that one has erased it, like in PoSE,
really can be different things.
7 There are some differences, the bounds in [7] are somewhat worse as they use hard-to-pebble graphs with worse parameters,
and [36] do not use a Merkle hash-tree to make the computation of the verifier independent of N .
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2 Defining Proofs of Space
We denote with (outV, outP) ← 〈V(inV),P(inP)〉(in) the execution of an interactive protocol be-
tween two parties P and V on shared input in, local inputs8 inP and inV, and with local outputs
outV and outP, respectively. A proof of space (PoS) is given by a pair of interactive random access
machines,9 a prover P and a verifier V. These parties run the PoS protocol in two phases: a PoS
initialization and a PoS execution as defined below. The protocols are executed with respect to
some statement id, given as common input (e.g., an email address in the example from the previ-
ous section). The identifier id is only required to make sure that P cannot reuse the same space to
execute PoS for different statements.
Initialization is an interactive protocol with shared inputs an identifier id, storage bound N ∈ N
and potentially some other parameters, which we denote with prm = (id, N, . . .). The execution
of the initialization is denoted by (Φ, S) ← 〈V,P〉(prm), where Φ is short and S is of size N .
V can output the special symbol Φ = ⊥, which means that it aborts (this can only be the case if
V interacts with a cheating prover).
Execution is an interactive protocol during which P and V have access to the values stored during
the initialization phase. The prover P has no output, the verifier V either accepts or rejects.
({accept, reject}, ∅)← 〈V(Φ),P(S)〉(prm)
In an honest execution the initialization is done once at the setup of the system, e.g., when the user
registers with the email service, while the execution can be repeated very efficiently many times
without requiring a large amount of computation.
To formally define a proof of space, we introduce the notion of a (N0, N1, T ) (dishonest) prover
P˜. P˜’s storage after the initiation phase is bounded by at mostN0, while during the execution phase
its storage is bounded to N1 and its running time is at most T (here N1 ≥ N0 as the storage during
execution contains at least the storage after initialization). We remark that P˜’s storage and running
time is unbounded during the the initialization phase (but, as just mentioned, only N0 storage is
available in-between the initialization and execution phase).
A protocol (P,V) as defined above is a (N0, N1, T )-proof of space, if it satisfies the properties
of completeness, soundness and efficiency defined below.
Completeness: We will require that for any honest prover P:
Pr[out = accept : (Φ, S)← 〈V,P〉(prm) , (out, ∅)← 〈V(Φ),P(S)〉(prm)] = 1.
Note that the probability above is exactly 1, and hence the completeness is perfect.
8 We use the expression “local input/output” instead the usual “private input/output”, because in our protocols no values will
actually be secret. The reason to distinguish between the parties’ inputs is only due to the fact that P’s input will be very large,
whereas we want V to use only small storage.
9 In a PoS, we want the prover P to run in time much less than its storage size. For this reason, we must model our parties as
random access machines (and not, say Turing machines), where accessing a storage location is assumed to take constant (or at
most polylogarithmic) time.
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Soundness: For any (N0, N1, T )-adversarial prover P˜ the probability that V accepts is negligible
in some statistical security parameter γ. More precisely, we have
Pr[out = accept : (Φ, S)← 〈V, P˜〉(prm), (out, ∅)← 〈V(Φ), P˜(S)〉(prm)] ≤ 2−Θ(γ) (1)
The probability above is taken over the random choice of the public parameters prm and the
coins of P˜ and V.10
Efficiency: We require the verifier V to be efficient, by which (here and below) we mean at most
polylogarithmic in N and polynomial in some security parameter γ. Prover P must be efficient
during execution, but can run in time poly(N) during initialization.11
In the soundness definition above, we only consider the case where the PoS is executed only once.
This is without loss of generality for PoS where V is stateless (apart from Φ) and holds no secret
values, and moreover the honest prover P uses only read access to the storage of size N holding S.
The protocols in this paper are of this form. We will sometimes say that a PoS is (N0, N1, T )-secure
if it is a (N0, N1, T )-proof of space.
It is instructive to observe what level of security trivially cannot be achieved by a PoS. Below
we use small letters n, t, c to denote values that are small, i.e., polylogarithmic inN and polynomial
in a security parameter γ. If the honest prover P is an (N,N + n, t) prover, where t, n denote the
time and storage requirements of P during execution, then there exists no
1. (N,N + n, t)-PoS, as the honest prover “breaks” the scheme by definition, and
2. (c, I+t+c, I+t)-PoS, where c is the number of bits sent by V to P during initialization. To see
this, consider a malicious prover P˜ that runs the initialization like the honest P, but then only
stores the messages sent by V during initialization instead of the entire large S. Later, during
execution, P˜ can simply emulate the initialization process (in time I) to get back S, and run the
normal execution protocol (in time t).
3 The model
We analyze the security and efficiency of our PoS in the random oracle (RO) model [12], making
an additional assumption on the behavior of adversaries, which we define and motivate below.
Recall that in the RO model, we assume that all parties (including adversaries) have access to the
same random function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L. In practice, one must instantiate H with a real
hash function like SHA3. Although security proofs in the RO model are just a heuristic argument
for real-world security, and there exist artificial schemes where this heuristic fails [15, 27, 38], the
model has proven surprisingly robust in practice.
Throughout, we fix the output length of our random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L to some
L ∈ N, which should be chosen large enough, so it is infeasible to find collisions. As finding a
10 Our construction is based on a hash-functionH, which will be part of prm and we require to be collision resistant. As assuming
collision resistance for a fixed function is not meaningful [47], we must either assume that the probability of Eq. (1) is over some
distribution of identities id (which can then be used as a hash key), or, if we modelH as a random oracle, over the choice of the
random oracle.
11 As explained in the introduction, P’s running time I during initialization must be at least linear in the size N of the storage. Our
construction basically match this I = Ω(N) lower bound as mentioned in Footnote 5.
7
collision requires roughly 2L/2 queries, setting L = 512 and assuming that the total number of
oracle queries during the entire experiment is upper bounded by, say 2L/3, would be a conservative
choice.
3.1 Modeling the malicious prover
In this paper, we want to make statements about adversaries (malicious provers) P˜ with access to
a random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L and bounded by three parameters N0, N1, T . They run in
two phases:
1. In a first (initialization) phase, P˜ makes queries12 A = (a1, . . . , aq) toH (adaptively, i.e., ai can
be a function of H(a1), . . . ,H(ai−1)). At the end of this phase, P˜ stores a file S of size N0L
bits, and moreover he must commit to a subset of the queries B ⊆ A of size N (technically,
we’ll do this by a Merkle hash-tree).
2. In a second phase, P˜(S) is asked to outputH(b) for some random b ∈ B. The malicious prover
P˜(S) is allowed a total number T of oracle queries in this phase, and can use up to N1L bits of
storage (including the N0L bits for S).
AsH is a random oracle, one cannot compress its uniformly random outputs. In particular, as S is
of sizeN0L, it cannot encode more thanN0 outputs ofH. We will make the simplifying assumption
that we can explicitly state which outputs these are by letting SH ⊂ {0, 1}L, |SH| ≤ N0 denote the
set of all possible outputsH(a), a ∈ A that P˜(S) can write down during the second phase without
explicitly querying H on input a in the 2nd phase.13 Similarly, the storage bound N1L during
execution implies that P˜ cannot store more than N1 outputs of H at any particular time point, and
we assume that this set of ≤ N1 inputs is well defined at any time-point. The above assumption
will allow us to bound the advantage of a malicious prover in terms of a pebbling game.
The fact that we need the additional assumption outlined above and cannot reduce the security
of our scheme to the plain random oracle model is a bit unsatisfactory, but unfortunately the stan-
dard tools (in particular, the elegant “ex post facto” argument from [21]), typically used to reduce
pebbling complexity to the number of random oracle queries, cannot be applied in our setting due
to the auxiliary information about the random oracle the adversary can store. We believe that a
proof exploiting the fact that random oracles are incompressible using techniques developed in
[50, 30] can be used to avoid this additional assumption, and we leave this question as interesting
future work.
12 The number q of queries in this phase is unbounded, except for the huge exponential 2L/3 bound on the total number of oracle
queries made during the entire experiment by all parties mentioned above.
13 Let us stress that we do not claim that such an SH exists for every P˜, one can easily come up with a prover where this is not the
case (as we will show below). All we need is that for every (N0, N1, T ) prover P˜, there exists another prover P˜′ with (almost)
the same parameters and advantage, that obeys our assumption.
An adversary with N0 = N1 = T = 1 not obeying our assumption is, e.g., a P˜ that makes queries 0 and 1 and stores
S = H(0) ⊕H(1) in the first phase. In the second phase, P˜(S) picks a random b ← {0, 1}, makes the query b, and can write
downH(b),H(1− b) = S ⊕H(b). Thus, P˜(S) can write 2 > N0 = 1 valuesH(0) orH(1) without quering them in the 2nd
phase.
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3.2 Storage and time complexity
Time complexity. Throughout, we let the running time of honest and adversarial parties be the
number of oracle queries they make. We also take into account that hashing long messages is more
expensive by ”charging” k queries for a single query on an input of bit-length L(k − 1) + 1 to
Lk. Just counting oracle queries is justified by the fact that almost all computation done by honest
parties consists of invocations of the random-oracle, thus we do not ignore any computation here.
Moreover, ignoring any computation done by adversaries only makes the security proof stronger.
Storage complexity. Unless mentioned otherwise, the storage of honest and adversarial parties
is measured by the number of outputs y = H(x) stored. The honest prover P will only store such
values by construction; for malicious provers P˜ this number is well defined under the assumption
from Sect. 3.1.
4 PoS from graphs with high pebbling complexity
The first ingredient of our proof uses graph pebbling. We consider a directed, acyclic graph G =
(V,E). The graph has |V | = N vertices, which we label with numbers from the set [N ] =
{1, . . . , N}. With every vertex v ∈ V we associate a value w(v) ∈ {0, 1}L, and extend the domain
of w to include also ordered tuples of elements from V in the following way: for V ′ = (v1, . . . , vn)
(where vi ∈ V ) we define w(V ′) = (w(v1), . . . , w(vn)). Let pi(v) = {v′ : (v′, v) ∈ E} denote v’s
predecessors (in some arbitrary, but fixed order). The value w(v) of v is computed by applying the
random oracle to the index v and the values of its predecessors
w(v) = H(v, w(pi(v))) . (2)
Note that if v is a source, i.e., pi(v) = ∅, then w(v) is simply H(v). Our PoS will be an extension
of the simple basic PoS (P0,V0)[G,Λ] from Figure 1, where Λ is an efficiently samplable distri-
bution that outputs a subset of the vertices V of G = (V,E). This PoS does not yet satisfy the
efficiency requirement from Sect. 2, as the complexity of the verifier needs to be as high as the one
of the prover. This is because, in order to perform the check in Step 3 of the execution phase, the
verifier needs to compute w(C) himself. In our model, as discussed in Sect. 3.1, the only way a
Parameters prm = (id, N,G = (V,E), Λ), where G is a graph on |V | = N vertices and Λ is an efficiently samplable
distribution over V β (we postpone specifying β as well as the function of id to Sect. 6).
Initialization (S, ∅)← 〈P0,V0〉(prm) where S = w(V ).
Execution (accept/reject, ∅)← 〈V(∅),P(S)〉(prm)
1. V0(∅) samples C ← Λ and sends C to P0.
2. P0(S) answers with A = w(C) ⊂ S.
3. V0(∅) outputs accept if A = w(C) and reject otherwise.
Fig. 1. The basic PoS (P0,V0)[G,Λ] (with inefficient verifier V0).
malicious prover P˜0(S) can determine w(v) is if w(v) ∈ SH is in the encoded set of size at most
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N0, or otherwise by explicitly making the oracle queryH(v, w(pi(v))) during execution. Note that
if w(i) 6∈ SH for some i ∈ pi(v), then P˜0(S) will have to make even more queries recursively to
learn w(v). Hence, in order to prove (N0, N1, T )-security of the PoS (P0,V0)[G,Λ] in our ideal-
ized model, it suffices to upper bound the advantage of Player 1 in the following pebbling game on
G = (V,E):
1. Player 1 puts up to N0 initial pebbles on the vertices of V .
2. Player 2 samples a subset C ← Λ of size α of challenge vertices.
3. Player 1 applies a sequence of up to T steps according to the following rules:
(i) it can place a pebble on a vertex v if (1) all its predecessors u ∈ pi(v) are pebbled and (2)
there are currently less than N1 vertices pebbled.
(ii) it can remove a pebble from any vertex.
4. Player 1 wins if it places pebbles on all vertices of C.
In the pebbling game above, Step 1 corresponds to a malicious prover P˜0 choosing the set SH.
Step 3 corresponds to P˜0 computing values according to the rules in Eq. (2), while obeying the N1
total storage bound. Putting a pebble corresponds to invoking y = H(x) and storing the value y.
Removing a pebble corresponds to deleting some previously computed y.
5 Efficient verifiers using hash trees
The PoS described in the previous section does not yet meet our Definition from Sect. 2 as V0 is not
efficient. In this section we describe how to make the verifier efficient, using hash-trees, a standard
cryptographic technique introduced by Ralph Merkle [39]
Using hash trees for committing. A hash-tree allows a party P to compute a commitment φ ∈
{0, 1}L to N data items x1, . . . , xN ∈ {0, 1}L using N − 1 invocations of a hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L. Later, P can prove to a party holding φ what the value of any xi is, by sending
only L logN bits. For example, for N = 8, P commits to x1, . . . , xN by hashing the xi’s in a tree
like structure as
φ = H(H(H(x1, x2),H(x3, x4) ),H(H(x5, x6),H(x7, x8) ) )
We will denote with T H(x1, . . . , xN) the 2N − 1 values of all the nodes (including the N leaves
xi and the root φ) of the hash-tree, e.g., for N = 8, where we define xab = H(xa, xb)
T H(x1, . . . , x8) = {x1, . . . , x8, x12, x34, x56, x78, x1234, x5678, φ = x12345678}
The prover P, in order to later efficiently open any xi, will store all 2N−1 values T = T H(x1, . . . , xN),
but only send the single root element φ to a verifier V. Later P can ”open” any value xi to V by
sending xi and the logN values, which correspond to the siblings of the nodes that lie on the path
from xi to φ, e.g., to open x3 P sends x3 and open(T , 3) = (x12, x4, x5678) and the prover checks if
vrfy(φ, 3, x3, (x12, x4, x5678)) =
(
H(x12,H(x3, x4)), x56789) ?= φ
)
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As indicated above, we denote with open(T , i) ⊂ T the logN values P must send to V in order to
open xi, and denote with vrfy(φ, i, xi, o)→ {accept, reject} the above verification procedure. This
scheme is correct, i.e., for φ, T computed as above and any i ∈ [N ], vrfy(φ, i, xi, open(T , i)) =
accept.
The security property provided by a hash-tree states that it is hard to open any committed value
in more than one possible way. This ”binding” property can be reduced to the collision resistance
of H: from any φ, i, (x, o), (x′, o′), x 6= x′ where vrfy(φ, i, x, o) = vrfy(φ, i, x′, o′) = accept, one
can efficiently extract a collision z 6= z′,H(z) = H(z′) forH.
to the graph based PoS from Figure 1, where the prover P(prm) commits to x1 = w(v1), . . . , xN =
w(vN) by computing a hash tree T = T H(x1, . . . , xN) and sending its root φ to V. In the execution
phase, the prover must then answer a challenge c not only with the value xc = w(c), but also open
c by sending (xc, open(T , c)) which P can do without any queries toH as it stored T .
If a cheating prover P˜(prm) sends a correctly computed φ during the initialization phase, then
during execution P˜(prm, S) can only make V(prm, φ) accept by either answering each challenge
c with the correct value w(c), or by breaking the binding property of the hash-tree (and thus the
collision resistance of the underlying hash-function).
We are left with the challenge to deal with a prover who might cheat and send a wrongly
computed Φ˜ 6= φ during initialization. Some simple solutions are
– Have V compute φ herself. This is not possible as we want V’s complexity to be only polylog
in N .
– Let P prove, using a proof system like computationally sound (CS) proofs [40] or universal
arguments [10], that φ was computed correctly. Although these proof systems do have polylog-
arithmic complexity for the verifier, and thus formally would meet our efficiency requirement,
they rely on the PCP theorem and thus are not really practical.
Dealing with wrong commitments. Unless P˜ breaks the collision resistance ofH, no matter what
commitment Φ˜ the prover P sends to V, he can later only open it to some fixed N values which we
will denote x˜1, . . . , x˜N .14 We say that x˜i is consistent if
x˜i = H(i, x˜i1 , . . . , x˜id) where pi(i) = {i1, . . . , id} (3)
Note that if all x˜i are consistent, then Φ˜ = φ. We add a second initialization phase to the PoS,
where V will check the consistency of α random x˜i’s. This can be done by having P˜ open x˜i and
x˜j for all j ∈ pi(i). If P˜ passes this check, we can be sure that with high probability a large fraction
of the x˜i’s is consistent. More concretely, if the number of challenge vertices is α = εt for some
ε > 0, then P˜ will fail the check with probability 1 − 2−Θ(t) if more than an ε-fraction of the x˜i’s
are inconsistent.
A cheating P˜ might still pass this phase with high probability with an Φ˜ where only 1 − ε
fraction of the x˜i are consistent for some sufficiently small ε > 0. As the inconsistent x˜i are not
outputs of H, P˜ can chose their value arbitrarily, e.g., all being 0L. Now P˜ does not have to store
this εN inconsistent values x˜j while still knowing them.
14 Potentially, P˜ cannot open some values at all, but wlog. we assume that it can open every value in exactly one way.
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In our idealized model as discussed in Sect. 3.1, one can show that this is already all the
advantage P˜ gets. We can model an εN fraction of inconsistent x˜i’s by slightly augmenting the
pebbling game from Sect. 4. Let the pebbles from the original game be white pebbles. We now
additionally allow player 1 to put εN red pebbles (apart from the N0 white pebbles) on V during
step 1. These red pebbles correspond to inconsistent values. The remaining game remains the same,
except that player 1 is never allowed to remove red pebbles.
We observe that being allowed to initially put an additional εN red pebbles is no more use-
ful than getting an additional εN white pebbles (as white pebbles are strictly more useful be-
cause, unlike red pebbles, they later can be removed.) Translated back to our PoS, in order prove
(N0, N1, T )-security of our PoS allowing up to εN inconsistent values, it suffices to prove (N0 −
εN,N1 − εN, T )-security of the PoS, assuming that the initial commitment is computed honestly,
and there are no inconsistent values (and thus no red pebbles in the corresponding game).
6 Our Main Construction
Below we formally define our PoS (P,V). The common input to P,V are the parameters prm =
(id, 2N, γ, G,Λ), which contain the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}∗, a storage bound 2N ∈ N (i.e., 2NL
bits),15 a statistical security parameter γ, the description of a graph G(V,E) on |V | = N vertices
and an efficiently samplable distribution Λ which outputs some ”challenge” set C ⊂ V of size
α = α(γ,N).
Below H denotes a hash function, that depends on id: given a hash function H′(.) (which we
will model as a random oracle in the security proof), throughout we let H(.) denote H′(id, .). The
reason for this is simply so we can assume that the random oracles H′(id, .) and H′(id′, .) used in
PoS with different identifiers id 6= id′ are independent, and thus anything stored for the PoS with
identifier id is useless to answer challenges in a PoS with different identifier id′.
Initialization (Φ, S)← 〈V,P〉(prm):
1. P sends V a commitment φ to w(V )
– P computes the values xi = w(i) for all i ∈ V as in Eq. (2).
– P’s output is a hash-tree S = T H(x1, . . . , xN), which requires |S| = (2N − 1)L
bits) as described in Sect. 5.
– P sends the root φ ∈ S to V.
2. P proves consistency of φ for α = α(γ,N) random values
– V picks a set of challenges C ← Λ where the size of C is α and sends C to P.
– For all c ∈ C, P opens the value corresponding to c and all its predecessors to V by
sending, for all c ∈ C
{(xi, open(S, i)) : i ∈ {c, pi(c)}}
15 We set the bound to 2N , so if we let N denote the number of vertices in the underlying graph, we must store 2N − 1 values of
the hash-tree.
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– V verifies that P sends all the required openings, and they are consistent, i.e., for
all c ∈ C the opened values x˜c and x˜i, i ∈ pi(c) = (i1, . . . , id) must satisfy x˜c =
H(c, x˜i1 , . . . , x˜id), and the verification of the opened commitments passes. If either
check fails, V outputs Φ = ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, V outputs Φ = φ, and the
initialization phase is over.
Execution (accept/reject, ∅)← 〈V(Φ),P(S)〉(prm):
P proves it stores the committed values by opening a random β = Θ(γ) subset of them
– V picks a challenge set C ⊂ V of size |C| = β at random, and sends C to P.
– P answers with {oc = (xc, open(S, c)) : c ∈ C}.
– V checks for every c ∈ C if vrfy(Φ, c, oc) ?= accept. V outputs accept if this is the case
and reject otherwise.
6.1 Constructions of the graphs
We consider the following pebbling game, between a player and a challenger, for a directed acyclic
graph G = (V,E) and a distribution λ over V .
1. Player puts initial pebbles on some subset U ⊆ V of vertices.
2. Challenger samples a “challenge vertex” c ∈ V according to λ.
3. Player applies a sequence of steps according to the following rules:
(i) it can place a pebble on a vertex v if all its predecessors u ∈ pi(v) are pebbled.
(ii) it can remove a pebble from any vertex.
4. Player wins if it places a pebble on c.
Let S0 = |U | be the number of initial pebbles, S1 be the total number of used pebbles (or equiva-
lently, the maximum number of pebbles that are present in the graph at any time instance, including
initialization), and let T be the number of pebbling steps given in 3i). The definition implies that
S1 ≥ S0 and T ≥ S1−S0. Note, with S0 = |V | pebbles the player can always achieve time T = 0:
it can just place initial pebbles on V .
Definition 1. Consider functions f = f(N,S0) and g = g(N,S0, S1). A family of graphs {GN =
(VN , EN) | |VN | = N ∈ N} is said to have pebbling complexity Ω(f, g) if there exist constants
c1, c2, δ > 0 and distributions λN over VN such that for any player that wins the pebbling game on
(GN , λN) (as described above) with probability 1 it holds that
Pr[ S1 ≥ c1f(N,S0) ∧ T ≥ c2g(N,S0, S1) ] ≥ δ (4)
Let G(N, d) be the set of directed acyclic graphs G = (V,E) with |V | = N vertices and the
maximum in-degree at most d. We now state our two main pebbling theorems:
Theorem 1. There exists an explicit family of graphs GN ∈ G(N, 2) with pebbling complexity
Ω(N/ logN, 0) (5)
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In the next theorem we use the Iverson bracket notation: [φ] = 1 if statement φ is true, and
[φ] = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2. There exists a family of graphs GN ∈ G(N,O(log logN)) with pebbling complexity
Ω(0, [S0 < τN ] ·max{N,N2/S1}) (6)
for some constant τ ∈ (0, 1). It can be constructed by a randomized algorithm with a polynomial
expected running time that produces the desired graph with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(N/ logN).
Remark 1. As shown in [32], any graphG ∈ G(N,O(1)) can be entirely pebbled using S1 = O(N/
logN) pebbles (without any initial pebbles). This implies that expression N/ logN in Theorem 1
cannot be improved upon. Note, this still leaves the possibility of a graph that can be pebbled using
O(N/ logN) pebbles only with a large time T (e.g. superpolynomial in N ). Examples of such
graph for a non-interactive version of the pebble game can be found in [37]. Results stated in [37],
however, do not immediately imply a similar bound for our interactive game.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Paul, Tarjan and Celoni [44] presented a family of graphs G(i) for i = 8, 9, 10, . . . with mi sources,
mi sinks and ni nodes where mi = 2i and ni = Θ(i2i). The following claim is a special case of
their Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. For any initial configuration of no more than cmi pebbled vertices (with c = 1/256)
there exists a sink whose pebbling requires a time instance at which at least cmi pebbles are on
the graph.
We can show the following.
Corollary 1. For a subset U ⊆ V let XU be the set of sinks whose pebbling requires at least 12cmi
pebbles starting with U as the initial set of pebbles. If |U | ≤ 1
2
cmi then |XU | ≥ 12cmi.
Proof. Assume that |U | ≤ 1
2
cmi and |XU | < 12cmi for some U ⊆ V . Consider the following
pebbling algorithm. First, place initial pebbles at vertices in U ∪ XU . To pebble remaining sinks
v /∈ XU , go through them in some order and do the following:
1. Remove all pebbles except those in U .
2. By definition of XU , vertex v can be pebbled using fewer than 12cmi pebbles. Run a modifica-
tion of the corresponding algorithm where pebbles in U are never removed.
This algorithm pebbles all sinks in some order, starts with |U | + |XU | < cmi initial pebbles,
and uses fewer than |U | + 1
2
cmi ≤ cmi pebbles at each time instance. By Lemma 1, this is a
contradiction.
uunionsq
We can now prove Theorem 1. Consider N ≥ n1, and let i be the largest integer such that
ni ≤ N . Let GN be the graph obtained from G(i) by adding N − ni “dummy” vertices. It can be
checked that mi = Θ(N/ logN).
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Let V˜ be the set of outputs of GN excluding dummy vertices, with |V˜ | = mi. We define λ to
be the uniform probability distribution over vertices c ∈ V˜ .
Let us show that S1 ≥ 12cmi = Θ(N/ logN) with probability at least δ = 12c. Assume that
|U | = S0 ≤ 12cmi, otherwise the claim is trivial. By Corollary 1 we have |XU | ≥ 12c|V˜ |. Using the
definition of set XU , we get
Pr[S1 ≥ 12cmi] ≥ Pr[c ∈ XU ] = |XU |/|V˜ | ≥ 12c = δ.
6.3 Sketch of the proof of Theorem 2
The complete proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C; here we give a brief summary of our
techniques. We use a new construction which relies on three building blocks: (i) random bipartite
graphs Rd(m) ∈ G(2m, d) with m inputs and m outputs; (ii) superconcentrator graphs C(m) with m
inputs and m outputs; (iii) graphs Dt = ([t], Et) of Erdo¨s, Graham and Szemere´di [24] with dense
long paths. These are directed acyclic graphs with t vertices andΘ(t log t) edges (of the form (i, j)
with i < j) that satisfy the following for some constant η ∈ (0, 1) and a sufficiently large t: for
any subset X ⊆ [t] of size at most ηt graph Dt contains a path of length at least ηt that avoids
X . We show that family Dt can be chosen so that the maximum in-degree is Θ(log t). The main
component of our construction is graph G˜d(m,t) defined as follows:
– Add mt nodes V˜ = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vt where |V1| = . . . = |Vt| = m. This will be the set of
challenges.
– For each edge (i, j) of graph Dt add a copy of graph Rd(m) from Vi to Vj , i.e. identify the inputs
of Rd(m) with nodes in Vi (using an arbitrary permutation) and the outputs of R
d
(m) with nodes
in Vj (again, using an arbitrary permutation).
We set d=Θ(1), t=Θ(logN) andm=Θ(N/t) (with specific constants), then G˜d(m,t)∈G(mt,O(log logN)).
Note that a somewhat similar graph was used by Dwork, Naor and Wee [21]. They connect
bipartite graphs Rd(m) consecutively, i.e. instead of graph Dt they use a chain graph with t nodes.
Dwork et al. give an intuitive argument that removing at most τm nodes from each layer V1, . . . , Vt
(for some constant τ < 1) always leaves a graph which is “well-connected”: informally speaking,
many nodes of V1 are still connected to many nodes of Vt. (We formalize their argument in Ap-
pendix C.) However, this does not hold if more than m = Θ(N/ logN) nodes are allowed to be
removed: by placing initial pebbles on, say, the middle layer Vt/2 one can completely disconnect
V1 from Vt.
In contrast, in our construction removing any τ ′N nodes still leaves a graph which is “well-
connected”. Our argument is as follows. If constant τ ′ is sufficiently small then there can be at
most ηt layers with more than τm initial pebbles (for a given constant τ < 1). By the property
of Dt, there exists a sufficiently long path P in Dt that avoids those layers. We can thus use the
argument above for the subgraph corresponding to P . We split P into three parts of equal size, and
show that many nodes in the first part are connected to many nodes in the third part.
In this way we prove that graphs G˜d(m,t) have pebbling complexity Ω(0, [S0 < τN ] · N). To
get complexity Ω(0, [S0 < τN ] · max{N,N2/S1}), we add mt extra nodes V0 and a copy of
superconcentrator C(mt) from V0 to V˜ . We then use a standard “basic lower bound argument” for
superconcentrators [37].
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6.4 Putting things together
Combining the results and definitions from the previous sections, we can now state our main theo-
rem.
Theorem 3. In the model from Sect. 3.1, for constants ci > 0, the PoS from Sect. 6 instantiated
with the graphs from Theorem 1 is a
(c1(N/ logN), c2(N/ logN),∞) -secure PoS . (7)
Instantiated with the graphs from Theorem 2 it is a
(c3N,∞, c4N)-secure PoS . (8)
Efficiency, measured as outlined in Sect. 3.2, is summarized in the table below where γ is the
statistical security parameter
communication computation P computation V
PoS Eq. (7) Initialization O(γ log2N) 4N O(γ log2N)
PoS Eq. (7) Execution O(γ logN) 0 O(γ logN)
PoS Eq. (8) Initialization O(γ logN log logN) O(N log logN) O(γ logN log logN)
PoS Eq. (8) Execution O(γ logN) 0 O(γ logN)
Eq. (8) means that a successful cheating prover must either store a file of size Ω(N) (in L bit
blocks) after initialization, or makeΩ(N) invocations to the RO. Eq. (7) gives a weakerΩ(N/ logN)
bound, but forces a potential adversary not storing that much after initialization, to use at least
Ω(N/ logN) storage during the execution phase, no matter how much time he is willing to invest.
This PoS could be interesting in contexts where one wants to be sure that one talks with a prover
who has access to significant memory during execution.
Below we explain how security and efficiency claims in the theorem were derived. We start by
analyzing the basic (inefficient verifier) PoS (P0,V0)[G,Λ] from Figure 1 if instantiated with the
graphs from Theorem 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. For some constants ci > 0, if GN has pebbling complexity Ω(f(N), 0) according
to Definition 1, then the basic PoS (P0,V0)[GN , ΛN ] as illustrated in Figure 1, where the distribu-
tion ΛN samplesΘ(γ) (for a statistical security parameter γ) vertices according to the distribution
λN from Def. 1, is
(S0, c1f(N),∞)-secure (for any S0 ≤ c1f(N)) (9)
If GN has pebbling complexity (0, g(N,S0, S1)), then for any S0, S1 the PoS
(P0,V0)[GN , ΛN ] is
(S0, S1, c2g(N,S0, S1))-secure. (10)
Above, secure means secure in the model from Sect. 3.1.
(The proof of appears in Appendix D.) Instantiating the above proposition with the graphs GN
from Theorem 1 and 2, we can conclude that the simple (inefficient verifier) PoS (P0,V0)[GN , ΛN ]
is
(c1N/ logN, c2N/ logN,∞) and (S0, S1, c3 · [S0 ≤ τN ] ·max{N,N2/S1}) (11)
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secure, respectively (for constants ci > 0, 0 < τ < 1 and [S0 < τN ] = 1 if S0 ≤ τN and
0 otherwise). If we set S0 = bτNc = c4N , the right side of Eq. (11) becomes (c4N,S1, c3 ·
max{N,N2/S1}) and further setting S1 = ∞ (c4N,∞, c3N) As explained in Sect. 5, we can
make the verifier V0 efficient during initialization, by giving up on εN in the storage bound. We
can choose ε ourselves, but must check Θ(γ/ε) values for consistency during initialization (for a
statistical security parameter γ). For our first PoS, we set ε = c1
2 logN
and get with c5 = c1/2 using
c2 ≥ c1
(c1 ·N/ logN − ε ·N︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c5N/ logN
, c2 ·N/ logN − ε ·N︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥c5N/ logN
,∞)
security as claimed in Eq. (7). For the second PoS, we set ε = c4
2
which gives with c6 = c4/2
(c4N − εN︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥c6N
,∞− εN, c3N)
security, as claimed in Eq. (8). Also, note that the PoS described above are PoS as defined in Sect. 6
if instantiated with the graphs from Theorem 1 and 2, respectively.
Efficiency of the PoS Eq. (7). We analyze the efficiency of our PoS, measuring time and storage
complexity as outlined in Sect. 3.2. Consider the (c1N/ logN, c2N/ logN,∞)-secure construction
from Eq. (7). In the first phase of the initialization, P needs roughly 4N = Θ(N) computation:
using that the underlying graph has max in-degree 2, computingw(V ) according to Eq. (2) requires
N hashes on inputs of length at most 2L + logN ≤ 3L, and P makes an additional N − 1 hashes
on inputs of length 2L to compute the hash-tree. The communication and V’s computation in the
first phase of initialization is Θ(1) (as V just receives the root φ ∈ {0, 1}L).
During the 2nd phase of the initialization, V will challenge P on α (to be determined) vertices
to make sure that with probability 1 − 2−Θ(γ), at most an ε = Θ(1/ logN) fraction of the xˆi
are inconsistent. As discussed above, for this we have to set α = Θ(γ logN). Because this PoS
is based on a graph with degree 2 (cf. Theorem 1), to check consistency of a xˆi one just has to
open 3 values. Opening the values requires to send logN values (and the verifier to compute that
many hashes). This adds up to an O(γ log2N) communication complexity during initialization,
V’s computation is of the same order.
During execution, P opens φ onΘ(γ) positions, which requiresΘ(γ logN) communication (in
L bit blocks), and Θ(γ logN) computation by V.
Efficiency of the PoS Eq. (8). Analyzing the efficiency of the second PoS is analogous to the first.
The main difference is that now the underlying graph has larger degree O(log logN) (cf. Thm. 2),
and we only need to set ε = Θ(1).
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A Time-Memory Tradeoffs
In this section we will explain why the probably most simple and intuitive construction of a PoS,
where the prover simply stores a table of outputs of a random function, only achieves very weak
security due to time-memory tradeoffs for inverting random functions [31]. Consider the following
simple PoS (P,V):
Initialization: P computes and stores a list L of tuples (H(i), i) for i ∈ [N ] = {1, . . . , N}, sorted
by the first item.
Execution: During execution
– V picks a random value i← [N ] and sends the challenge c = H(i) to P(L).
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– On input c, P(L) checks if some tuple (c, j) is in L (which can be done in log(N) time as
L is sorted), and sends back j in this case.
– V accepts if j = i.
Intuitively, in order to make the verifier accept with constant probability, a cheating prover P˜ must
either store a large fraction of the outputs H(i) (and thus use N0 = Θ(N) storage), or search for
the i satisfyingH(i) = c by brute force (and thus use T = Θ(N) time). One thus might be tempted
to conjecture that this is indeed an (c1N,∞, c2N)-secure PoS for some constants c1, c2 > 0.
Unfortunately, this is not the case due to existing time-memory trade-offs for inverting random
functions. Hellman [31] showed that one can invert any function X → Y with input domain of size
|X | = N with constant probability in time Θ(N2/3) using Θ(N2/3) storage. This means that this
PoS is not even (c1N2/3,∞, c2N2/3)-secure16 for some c1, c2 > 0. Moreover, the Θ(N2/3) storage
required to break the function in Θ(N2/3) time can be initialized in time linear in N with small
hidden constants, thus this attack is very much practical.
B Online-Polls.
As another illustrative example for an (interactive, single-prover) PoS, consider on-line polling
systems, like the one that is used by Wikipedia to reach consensus amongst the editors of an
article. Currently, such systems do not offer sufficient protection against malicious users creating
many fake identities in order to vote multiple times. A natural remedy to this problem is to link
voting with a proof of work. This however is problematic, since honest users would typically not
be willing to devote significant amount of their processor times to such a vote, whereas a party
having a strong interest in obstructing the vote might well do so.
To give an numerical example, if the PoW requires 5 min to compute, then a dishonest player
can cast almost 2000 “fake” votes in a week. If one uses PoS instead, then the situation (while
still not perfect) is much better, as to achieve a similar result an adversary would need to buy a
significant amount of storage. For example, if we require a user to dedicate 100 GB of disk-space
in order to participate in votes, then in order to be able to cast 2000 votes, an adversary would need
to invest in 200 TB of disk space, which may be prohibitive for a typical internet vandal.
C Proof of Theorem 2
For a graph G = (V,E) and a subset X ⊆ V we denote
– G[X] to be the subgraph of G induced by X;
– G \X = G[V −X] to be the graph obtained by removing vertices in X;
– ΠG(X) to be the set of ancestors of nodes in X , i.e. the set of vertices v ∈ V from which set
X is reachable in G.
16 Recall that setting N1 = ∞ just means we put no bound no the storage used during execution, but of course N1 is upper
bounded by the running time during execution plus the initial storage, so we could replace∞ with c3N2/3 (for some c3 > 0)
here without affecting the statement.
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Some of the graphs considered in this section will implicitly come with the sets of inputs and
outputs, which will be denoted as V + ⊆ V and V − ⊆ V respectively. In such cases subgraph
G[X] will have inputs V + ∩ X and outputs V − ∩ X (and similarly for G \ X). We also denote
Π+G (X) = ΠG(X) ∩ V + to be the set of input vertices from which set X is reachable in G. If
X = {v} then we write the sets as ΠG(v) and Π+G (v). We generally use the following convention:
a subscript without parentheses denotes the number of nodes of a directed acyclic graph (e.g. GN ),
while a subscript in parentheses denotes the number of inputs and outputs (e.g. graphs Rd(m) and
C(m) below).
C.1 Building blocks
Our construction will rely on three building blocks. The first one is a bipartite random graphRd(m) ∈
G(2m, d) with |V +| = m inputs and |V −| = m outputs generated as follows: for each output vertex
v ∈ V − select vertices u1, . . . , ud ∈ V + uniformly at random and add edges (u1, v), . . . , (ud, v) to
Rd(m). Note, we allow repetitions among u1, . . . , ud. Graph R
d
(m) is known to be a good expander
graph with a high probability [52]; we refer to Section C.3 for a definition of expanders.
Our next building block is superconcentrator graphs.
Definition 2. A directed acyclic graph C(m) = (V,E) with inputs V + and outputs V − of size
|V +| = |V −| = m is called a superconcentrator if for every k ∈ [m] and every pair of subsets
A ⊆ V +, B ⊆ V − of size |A| = |B| = k there exist k vertex disjoint paths in C(m) from A to B.
A family of superconcentrators C(m) is called linear if it has Θ(m) nodes and edges and its
maximum in-degree is bounded by a constant. The existence of such superconcentrators was first
shown by Valiant [53]; they used (270 + o(1))m edges. The constant was successively improved
in a long series of works. Currently, the smallest construction is claimed by Kolmogorov and
Rolı´nek [?]; it uses (25.3 + o(1))m edges, and relies on a probabilistic argument. There are also
explicit constructions of linear superconcentrators, e.g. by Alon and Capalbo [2] with (44+o(1))m
edges.
Our third tool is graphs of Erdo¨s, Graham and Szemere´di [24] with dense long paths.
Theorem 4 ([24]). There exists a family of directed acyclic graphs Dt = ([t], Et) with t vertices
and Θ(t log t) edges (of the form (i, j) with i < j) that satisfy the following for some constant
η ∈ (0, 1) and a sufficiently large t:
– For any subset X ⊆ [t] of size at most ηt graph Dt \X contains a path of length at least ηt.
Note that the construction in [24] is randomized. In this paper we use this graph for t = O(logN),
therefore the property above can be checked explicitly in time polynomial in N . This gives a Las
Vegas algorithm for constructing graphs Dt with a polynomial expected running time17.
We can also show the following.
17 More precisely, the construction in [24] uses graphs with certain properties (see their first lemma, conditions (i)-(iii)). They
show that certain random graphs satisfy (i)-(iii) with probability Θ(1). Properties (i)-(iii) can be checked in time 2Θ(t) which is
polynomial in N . We can thus first compute graphs satisfying (i)-(iii) with a Las Vegas algorithm, and then use them to build
Dt.
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Proposition 2. Family Dt in Theorem 4 can be chosen so that the maximum in-degree is Θ(log t).
Proof. Consider graph Dt = (V,E) from Theorem 4, with V = [t] and |E| ≤ ct log t. For a node
v ∈ V let Tv be the subgraph of Dt containing node v, its predecessors pi(v) and all edges from
pi(v) to v. Note, Dt is an edge-disjoint union of graphs Tv over v ∈ V .
Let d∗ be the smallest even integer satisfying 2d∗ ≥ t. Transform tree Tv to a tree T ′v as follows:
if dv = |pi(v)| ≤ d∗ then T ′v = Tv, otherwise make T ′v a tree with the root v and the leaves pi(v)
such that the degree of all non-leaf nodes belongs to [d∗/2, d∗]. (Such tree can be obtained from
Tv by repeatedly “splitting” nodes with more than d∗ children.) Nodes of Tv will be called “old”
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graphs T ′v over v ∈ V .
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dv = α|E| ≤ αct log t = (2c+ o(1))t
Therefore, graph D′t has Θ(t) nodes and maximum in-degree d
∗ = Θ(log t).
Let us show that for any subset X ′ ⊆ V ′ with |X ′| ≤ ηt graph D′t contains a path of length
at least ηt that does not intersect X ′; this will imply the main claim of the proposition. Define set
X ⊆ V via X = {φ(v) | v ∈ X} where mapping φ : V ′ → V is the identity for old nodes, and
maps new nodes in T ′v to v. Clearly, |X| ≤ ηt. By Theorem 4, graphDt contains a path P of length
at least ηt. This path can be naturally mapped to path P ′ in D′t (P
′ passes through the vertices of P
and possibly through some new nodes). It can be seen that P ′ does not intersect X ′ and the length
of P ′ is the same or larger than the length of P .
uunionsq
C.2 Construction ofGN
We are now ready to present our construction for Theorem 2. For integers m, t, d > 0 define graph
Gd(m,t) as follows:
– Add 2mt nodes V0 ∪ V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vt where |V0| = mt and |V1| = . . . = |Vt| = m. Denote
V˜ = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vt (this will be the set of challenges).
– Add a copy of superconcentrator C(mt) from V0 to V˜ , i.e. identify the inputs of C(mt) with nodes
in V0 (using an arbitrary permutation) and the outputs of C(mt) with nodes in V˜ (again, using
an arbitrary permutation).
– For each edge (i, j) of graph Dt add a copy of graph Rd(m) from Vi to Vj .
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It can be seen that Gd(m,t) ∈ G(2mt,O(d log t)) (we assume that graph Dt has been chosen as in
Proposition 2).
GraphGN = (V,E) for a sufficiently largeN will be defined asGd(m,t) for certain valuesm, t, d
(plus “dummy” vertices to make the number of nodes in GN to equal N ). We set t = bµ logNc
and m = bN/(2t)c where µ > 0 is a certain constant. The family of graphs GN is now completely
defined (except for the value of constants µ, d). Note that GN ∈ G(N,O(log logN)) since d is
constant.
Remark 2 There are certain similarities between our construction and the construction of Dwork,
Naor and Wee [21]. They connect bipartite expander graphs consecutively, i.e. instead of graph
Dt they use a chain graph with t nodes. Set V0 in their construction has size m, and instead of
C(mt) an extra graph is added from V0 to V1 (which is either a stack of superconcentrators or a
graph from [44]). Dwork et al. give an intuitive argument that removing at most τm nodes from
each layer V1, . . . , Vt (for some constant τ < 1) always leaves a graph which is “well-connected”:
informally speaking, many nodes of V1 are still connected to many nodes of Vt. However, this
does not hold if more than m = Θ(N/ logN) nodes are allowed to be removed: by placing initial
pebbles on, say, the middle layer Vt/2 player 1 can completely disconnect V1 from Vt.
In contrast, in our construction removing any τ ′N nodes still leaves a graph which is “well-
connected”. Our argument is as follows. If constant τ ′ is sufficiently small then there can be at
most ηt layers with more than τm initial pebbles (for a given constant τ < 1). By the property
of Dt, there exists a sufficiently long path P in Dt that avoids those layers. We can thus use the
argument above for the subgraph corresponding to P . We split P into three parts of equal size, and
show that many nodes in the first part are connected to many nodes in the third part.
Remark 3 As an alternative, we could have omitted superconcentrator C(mt) in the construction
above. As will become clear from the next two sections, the resulting family of graphs would have
a pebbling complexity
Ω(0, [S0 < τN ] ·N) (12)
for some constant τ ∈ (0, 1) (with probability at least 1 − 2−Θ(N/ logN), for appropriate values of
d, µ). However, we currently do not have any bounds on the number of pebbles S1 for such graphs;
the purpose of adding C(mt) was to get such bounds.
Graphs without C(mt) could be used if the amount of additional storage in the execution stage
does not matter for a particular application.
C.3 Robust expanders
In order to analyze the construction above, we define the notion of a robust expander.
Definition 3. Consider graph G = (V,E) with inputs V + and outputs V −, values a, b, c > 0 and
an interval K = [kmin, kmax].
(a) G is called a (K, c)-expander if for every set of outputs X ⊆ V − of size |X| ∈ K there holds
|Π+G (X)| ≥ c|X|.
(b) G is called a robust (a, b,K, c)-expander if for every set of non-output vertices A ⊆ V − V −
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of size |A| ≤ a there exists a set of outputs B ⊆ V − of size |B| ≤ b such that graph G \ (A ∪ B)
is a (K, c)-expander.
By (k, c)-expanders and robust (a, b, k, c)-expanders we will mean expanders with the interval
K = [1, k]. Intuitively, robust expansion means that the expansion property of the graph is fault-
tolerant: it survives (for a large subgraph) when a constant fraction of nodes is removed.
It is known [52] that for a sufficiently large d graph Rd(m) is an expander (for appropriate
parameters) with a high probability. We show that it is also a robust expander; a proof is given
in Section C.5. 18
Theorem 5. There exist constants α, κ, γ ∈ (0, 1) and integer d > 0 with γd > 1 such that graph





, γd)-expander with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(m).
From now on we fix values α, κ, γ, d from Theorem 5. We can now specify value µ used in the




Consider graph GN = (V,E) that was obtained from graph Gd(m,t). Let G be the subgraph of GN
induced by the set V˜ = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vt of size |V˜ | = mt. From now on we assume that graph Rd(m)
used in the construction of GN is a robust (αm, 12αm, κ
m
d
, γd)-expander; by Theorem 5 this holds
with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(m) = 1− 2−Θ(N/ logN).
Theorem 6. For any subset U ⊆ V˜ of size |U | ≤ 1
2
ηα·mt there exist at least 1
3
η(1−α)·mt−O(m)
vertices v ∈ V˜ − U satisfying |ΠG\U(v)| ≥ 13ηκγ ·mt−O(m).
Proof. Let Q ⊆ [t] be the set of indices i satisfying |Vi ∩ U | ≥ 12αm. We have
1
2
ηαmt ≥ |U | ≥ |Q| · 1
2
αm ⇒ |Q| ≤ ηt
By the property of Theorem 4 graph Dt contains directed path P of length at least ηt that does not
intersect Q. Thus, for each node i of P we have |Vi ∩ U | ≤ 12αm.
For each node i of P we define set Ui with Vi ∩ U ⊆ Ui ⊆ Vi and |Ui| ≤ αm using the
following recursion:
– If i is the first node of P then set Ui = Vi ∩ U .
– Consider edge (i, j) of P for which set Ui has been defined. Denote Rij = G[Vi ∪ Vj]; it is a
copy of Rd(m). By the robust expansion property there exists subset Bj ⊆ Vj with |Bj| ≤ 12αm
such that graph Rij \ (Ui ∪Bj) is a (κmd , γd)-expander.
We define Uj = (Vj ∩ U) ∪Bj , then |Uj| ≤ |Vj ∩ U |+ |Bj| ≤ 12αm+ 12αm = αm.
18 Note that the robust expansion property has been formulated in [21, Section 4]. Namely, they say that “in any good enough
expander if up to some constant (related to the expansion) fraction of nodes are deleted, then one can still find a smaller
expander (of linear size) in the surviving graph”. To support this claim, they cite [3, 51]. However, we were unable to find such
statement in these references.
We believe that inferring the robust expansion property ofRd(m) just from the ordinary expansion is indeed possible, but with
a worse bound on the probability and with worse constants compared to what we have in Theorem 5 and its proof.
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Note that graph Rij \ (Ui ∪Uj) is also a (κmd , γd)-expander: it is obtained from Rij \ (Ui ∪Bj) by
removing a subset of outputs, and such operation preserves the expansion property.
Let I ⊆ [t] be the first b1
3
ηtc nodes of P and J ⊆ [t] be the last b1
3
ηtc nodes. Consider vertex
v◦ ∈ Vj − Uj for index j◦ ∈ J . We will show |ΠG\U(v◦)| ≥ 13ηκγ ·mt − O(m). This will imply
the theorem since the number of such vertices is at least |J | · (m−αm) ≥ 1
3
ηt · (1−α)m−O(m).
For nodes i of path P denote
Xi = ΠG\U(v◦) ∩ (Vi − Ui) (14)
For a node i ≤ j◦ of P let `(i) be the distance from i to j◦ along P (with `(j◦) = 0). We use
induction on `(i) to show that
|Xi| ≥ min{(γd)`(i), bκmd c · γd} (15)
For `(i) = 0 the claim is trivial (since Xj◦ = {v◦}). Suppose it holds for j, and consider edge (i, j)
of path P . Note that `(i) = `(j)+1. By construction, graphRij \(Ui∪Uj) is a (κmd , γd)-expander.
Furthermore,Π+Rij\(Ui∪Uj)(Xj) ⊆ Xi. Together with the induction hypothesis this implies the claim
of the induction step:
|Xi| ≥ |Π+Rij\(Ui∪Uj)(Xj)| ≥ γd ·min{|Xj|, bκmd c}
≥ γd ·min{(γd)`(j), bκm
d
c · γd, bκm
d
c} = min{(γd)`(j)+1, bκm
d
c · γd}
We have proved eq. (15) for all nodes i of P . Now consider node i ∈ I . We have `(i) ≥ 1
3
ηt
and also t = bµ logNc ≥ µ logm ≥ 3
η log(γd)
logm. Therefore,
(γd)`(i) ≥ (γd) 13η· 3η log(γd) logm = m
and so the minimum in (15) is achieved by the second expression bκm
d
c ·γd = κγm−O(1). (Note,




i∈I |Xi| ≥ (13ηt−O(1)) · (κγm−O(1)) = 13ηκγ ·mt−O(m) uunionsq
C.4 Proof of Theorem 2: a wrap-up
Using Theorem 6 and a result from [37], we can now show that graphs GN have a pebbling com-
plexity Ω(0, [S0 < τN ] ·max{N,N2/S1}) where τ = 12ηα ·minN mtN ∈ (0, 1). We define λN as
the uniform probability distribution over vertices c ∈ V˜ .
Assume that the set initial pebbles U ⊆ V chosen by player 1 has size |U | = S0 < τN ,
otherwise the claim is trivial. Fix a constant ρ ∈ (0, 1
3
ηκγ). We say that a sample c← λN is good
if |ΠG\U(c)| > ρ·mt. Theorem 6 implies that c is good with probability at least δ for some constant
δ > 0 (assuming that N is sufficiently large).
Let us assume that c is good. To pebble c, one must pebble at least ρ · mt nodes of V˜ ; this
requires time T = Ω(N). Next, we use the following standard result about superconcentrators; it
is a special case of Lemma 3.2.1 in [37].
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Lemma 2. In order to pebble 2S1 + 1 outputs of superconcentrator C(mt), starting and finishing
with a configuration of at most S1 pebbles, at least mt− 2S1 different inputs of the graph have to
be pebbled and unpebbled.
By applying this lemma bρ · mt/(2S1 + 1)c times we conclude that pebbling c with at most S1
pebbles requires time T = Ω(N2/S1). The theorem is proved.
C.5 Proof of Theorem 5 (robust expansion ofRd(m))
In this section we denote graph Rd(m) as G = (V,E) (with inputs V
+ and outputs V −). For a set of
output nodes X ⊆ V − let pi(X) = Π+G (X) =
⋃
v∈X pi(v) be the set of predecessors of nodes in X .
We will use the following fact about the binomial distribution (see [6]).
Theorem 7. Suppose that X1, . . . , XN are independent {0, 1}-valued variables with p = p(Xi =













H(a, p) = a ln
a
p
+ (1− a) ln 1− a
1− p




α < δ − γ (16b)
q < β where q = exp(−d ·H(δ − γ, α)) (16c)
H(β, q)− ln e
α
> 0 (16d)
κ < δ¯ where δ¯ = 1− δ (16e)
δ¯d > 1 (16f)
− ln(de) + d · [δ¯ ln δ¯ + δ ln δ] + (δ¯d− 1) · ln 1
κ
> 0 (16g)
Examples of feasible parameters are given in Table 1. We will show that Theorem 5 holds for any
values satisfying (16). 19





kmin = bmin{(12α− β)m, 12kmax}c (17b)
K = [kmin, kmax] (17c)
We also introduce the following definition.
19 We conjecture that the constants could be improved if instead of Rd(m) we used a random bipartite graph (with multi-edges
allowed) in which degrees of nodes in both V + in V − equal d (i.e. a union of d random permutation graphs). Expansion
properties of such graphs were analyzed in [11].
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α κ γ δ d
0.12 1/8 1/4 0.676 ≥ 190
0.19 1/16 1/8 0.757 ≥ 67
0.22 1/32 1/16 0.800 ≥ 43
0.24 1/64 1/32 0.827 ≥ 34
Table 1. Feasible parameters satisfying (16). We always use β = 1
2
α−  for a sufficiently small  > 0.
Definition 4. For a set of inputs A ⊆ V + define set of outputs BA via
BA = {v ∈ V − | |pi(v) ∩ A| ≥ (δ − γ)d} (18)
Graph G is a backward (a, b)-expander if |BA| ≤ b for any set A ⊆ V + of size |A| ≤ a.
Theorem 5 will follow from the following three facts.
Lemma 3. Suppose that G is a backward (αm, βm)-expander and also a (K, δd)-expander.
(a) It is a robust (αm, βm,K, γd)-expander.
(b) It is a robust (αm, βm+ kmin, kmax, γd)-expander.
Lemma 4. There exists constant c1 > 0 such that
Pr[ G is not a backward (αm, βm)-expander ] ≤ 2−c1m
Lemma 5. There exists constant c2 > 0 such that
Pr[ G is not a (K, δd)-expander ] ≤ 2 · 2−c2kmin
As a corollary, we obtain that G is a robust (αm, βm+ kmin, κmd , γd)-expander with probability at




, γd)-expander with this
probability, since 1
2
α ≥ βm + kmin. By observing that c1m = Θ(m) and c2kmin = Θ(m) we get
Theorem 5.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemmas 3-5.
Proof of Lemma 3(a) Given set A ⊆ V + of size |A| ≤ αm, we construct set B via B = BA;
the backward expansion property implies that |B| ≤ βm. Let us show that graph G \ (A ∪ B) is
a (K, γd)-expander. Consider set X ⊆ V − − B with |X| = k ∈ K. We can partition pi(X) into
disjoint sets Y = pi(X) ∩ A and Z = pi(X) − A. For each v ∈ X denote Yv = pi(v) ∩ A, then
|Yv| ≤ (δ − γ)d (since v /∈ BA). The desired inequality can now be derived as follows:






|Yv| ≥ δkd− |X| · (δ − γ)d = γkd
Proof of Lemma 3(b) Consider set A ⊆ V + of size |A| ≤ αm. By Lemma 3(a) there exists set
B ⊆ V − of size B ≤ βm such that graph G \ (A ∪ B) is a (K, γd)-expander. We will denote this
graph as Gˆ, and its inputs and outputs as Vˆ + = V +−A and Vˆ − = V −−B respectively. For a set
X ⊂ Xˆ− let pˆi(X) ⊆ Vˆ + be the set of predecessors of X in Gˆ.
We will show that there exists set Bˆ ⊆ Vˆ − of size |Bˆ| ≤ kmin − 1 such that graph Gˆ \ Bˆ is a
(kmax, γd)-expander; this will imply the claim of the lemma. In fact, it suffices to show that it is a
(kmin− 1, γd)-expander, since we already know that Gˆ \ Bˆ is a ([kmin, kmax], γd)-expander for any
Bˆ ⊆ Vˆ −.
We construct set Bˆ using the following greedy algorithm:
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– set Bˆ := ∅;
– while there exists subset X ⊆ Vˆ − − Bˆ such that |X| ≤ kmin − 1 and |pˆi(X)| < γd|X|, update
Bˆ := Bˆ ∪X .
By construction, upon termination we get set Bˆ such that graph Gˆ \ Bˆ is a (kmin − 1, c)-expander.
To prove the lemma, it thus suffices to show that |Bˆ| ≤ kmin − 1. Suppose that this is not the case.
Let Bˆ′ ⊆ Bˆ be the first subset during the execution of the algorithm whose size exceeds kmin − 1,
then kmin ≤ |Bˆ′| ≤ 2kmin ≤ kmax. We have |Bˆ′| ∈ K, so the (K, γd)-expansion property of
Gˆ implies that |pˆi(Bˆ′)| ≥ γd|Bˆ′|. However, by inspecting the algorithm above we conclude that
|pˆi(Bˆ′)| < γd|Bˆ′| - a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4 Denote α′ = bαmc/m ≤ α. Clearly, it suffices to prove the backward
expansion property only for sets of inputs A ⊆ V + of size |A| = bαmc = α′m. Let us fix
such set A. For an output vertex v ∈ V − denote q′ = Pr[v ∈ BA]. It is the probability that
|pi(v) ∩ A| ≥ (δ − γ)d. Each node u ∈ pi(v) falls in A with probability α′ = |A|/m, therefore
q′ = F≥((δ − γ)d; d, α′) ≤ F≥((δ − γ)d; d, α) ≤ exp(−d ·H(δ − γ, α)) = q
(We used the fact that δ − γ > α by (16b).) From the inequalities above and from (16c) we get
q′ ≤ q < β, therefore
Pr[|BA| ≥ βm] = F≥(βm;m, q′) ≤ F≥(βm;m, q) ≤ exp (−m ·H(β, q))
We now use a union bound:













exp (−m ·H(β, q))
= exp




Combined with condition (16d), this implies the claim.
Proof of Lemma 5 We follow the argument from [52], only with different constants. Consider
integer k ∈ K = [kmin, κmd ], and let pk be the probability that there exists set X ⊆ V − of size
exactly k with |pi(X)| < δd · k. We prove below that pk ≤ 2−ck for some constant c > 0. This will
imply Lemma 5 since then








2−i = 2 · 2−ckmin
Recall that we denoted δ¯ = 1− δ. Let us also denote λ = kd
m
. Note, condition k ≤ κm
d
implies
that λ ≤ κ.
Consider a fixed set X ⊆ V − of size k. Let us estimate the probability that |pi(X)| < γ¯kd.
Set pi(X) contains a union of kd independent random variables J1, . . . , Jkd where each Ji is a
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node in V + chosen uniformly at random. We can imagine these nodes J1, . . . , Jkd being chosen
in sequence. Call Ji a repeat if Ji ∈ {J1, . . . , Ji−1}. Then the probability that Ji is a repeat, even
conditioned on J1, . . . , Ji − 1, is at most i−1m ≤ kdm = λ.
Let Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆkd be independent random variables that take values “repeat” and “no repeat”,
with Pr[Jˆi = repeat] = λ. Then
Pr[ |pi(X)| < δkd ]≤ Pr[ there are at least bδ¯kd+ 1c repeats among J1, . . . , Jkd ]
≤ Pr[ there are at least bδ¯kd+ 1c repeats among Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆkd ]
= F≥(bδ¯kd+ 1c; kd, λ) ≤ F≥(δ¯kd; kd, λ) ≤ exp
(−kd ·H(δ¯, λ))




















−k · [ − ln de
λ
+ d · δ¯ ln δ¯
λ




( −k · [ σ + (δ¯d− 1) · ln 1
λ




where in σ we collected terms that do not depend on λ:
σ = − ln(de) + d · [δ¯ ln δ¯ + δ ln δ]





1−λ ≥ 0 into (19) gives
pk ≤ exp




The coefficient after k in the last expression is a positive constant according to (16g). The claim
pk ≤ 2−ck for a constant c > 0 is proved.
C.6 Superconcentrators are robust expanders
For completeness, in this section we show that superconcentrators are also robust expanders (for
appropriate parameters). This suggests that in the construction of GN one could replace bipartite
random graph Rd(m) with superconcentrator C(m); the argument of Theorem 6 would still apply.
More precisely, we have two options:
– When adding a copy of C(m) for edge (i, j) ∈ Dt, create unique copies of internal nodes of
C(m) (i.e. those nodes that are neither inputs nor outputs; there are Θ(m) such nodes). Graph
G(m,t) would then have Θ(mt log t) nodes instead of Θ(mt) nodes. We could thus obtain a
family of graphs GN with a constant average degree and pebbling complexity
Ω(0, [S0 < τ
N
log logN
] · ( N
log logN
)2/S1) (20)
for some constant τ > 0.
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– Share internal nodes of superconcentrators for edges (i, j) that are going to the same node
j ∈ [t]. Graph G(m,t) would then have Θ(mt) nodes. This would give a family of graphs
GN ∈ G(N,O(log logN)) with the same pebbling complexity as in Theorem 2.
We omit formal derivations of these claims (thus leaving them as conjectures); instead, we only
prove the following result.
Theorem 8. Suppose that valuesm,α, k, c satisfy c(αm+k) ≤ (1−α)m. Then superconcentrator
G = (V,E) with |V +| = m inputs and |V −| = m outputs is a robust (αm,αm, k, c)-expander.
We will need the following well-known property of a superconcentrator.
Lemma 6 ([44]). IfA ⊆ V −V −,B ⊆ V − are subsets with |A| < |B| then |Π+G\A(B)| ≥ m−|A|.
Proof. If |Π+G\A(B)| < m − |A| then |V + − Π+G\A(B)| ≥ |A| + 1, so there must exist |A| + 1
vertex-disjoint paths between V + − Π+G\A(B) and B. At least one of them does not intersect A,
and thus its source node belongs to Π+G\A(B) - a contradiction.
uunionsq
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 8. Consider subset A ⊆ V − V − with |A| ≤ αm.
We construct set B ⊆ V − using the following greedy algorithm:
– set B := ∅;
– while there exists subset X ⊆ V − − B such that |X| ≤ k and |Π+G\A(X)| < c|X|, update
B := B ∪X .
By construction, upon termination we get set B such that graph G \ (A ∪ B) is a (k, c)-expander.
To prove the theorem, it thus suffices to show that |B| ≤ αm. Suppose that |B| > αm. Let
B′ ⊆ B be the first subset during the execution of the algorithm whose size exceeds αm, then
αm < |B′| ≤ αm + k. We have |B′| > |A|, so by Lemma 6 |Π+G\A(B′)| ≥ m − |A| ≥ (1 −
α)m. By inspecting the algorithm above we conclude that |Π+G\A(B′)| < c|B′|. We obtained that
c(αm+ k) ≥ c|B′| > (1− α)m - a contradiction.
D Proof of Proposition 1
We start explaining the security as claimed in Eq. (9). GN having pebbling complexity (f(N), 0)
means, that any player 1 who is allowed to put at most c1f(N) (for some constant c1 > 0) pebbles
on the graph simultaneously must fail in pebbling a challenge vertex c ← λN with probability
at least δ for some constant δ > 0 (even with no bound on the number of pebbling steps). If we
now pick Θ(γ) challenge vertices C ← ΛN independently, then with probability 1 − (1 − δ)γ =
1 − 2−Θ(γ) we will hit a vertex that cannot be pebbled with c1f(N) pebbles. As discussed in
Section 4, this means the scheme is (0, c1f(N),∞)-secure. Observing that (0, S1,∞)-security
implies (S0, S1,∞)-security for any S0 ≤ S1 proves Eq. (9).
We will now show Eq. (10). GN having pebbling complexity (0, g(N,S0, S1)) means that any
player 1 who is allowed to put S0 pebbles on the graph initially, and then use at most S1 pebbles
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simultaneously making at most c2g(N,S0, S1) pebbling steps, must fail in pebbling a challenge
vertex c ← λN with probability at least δ > 0. As above, if we pick Θ(γ) challenges C ←
ΛN independently, then with probability 1 − (1 − δ)γ = 1 − 2−Θ(γ) we will hit a vertex that
cannot be pebbled with c2g(N,S0, S1) steps. As discussed in Section 4, this means the scheme
(S0, S1, c2g(S0, S1, N))-secure.
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